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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN ASSOCIA-
TION OF CREDIT MEN ' 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
F. C. WATTERSON et al, 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The case which is the subject matter of this Appeal 
involves an action in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, by the plaintiff and respondent, Inter-
mountain Association of Credit Men, against the de-
fendant and appellant, F. C. Watterson and his son-
in-law, Rolfe Griffiths, to recover the balance purport-
edly due from the Silver Creek General Store in Picabo, 
1 
Idaho, to both Salt Lake Hardware Company and to 
Barwick and Company for goods, wares and merchan-
dise sold and delivered to the Silver Creek General 
Store by said companies, and, which claims were as-
signed by said companies to the Intermountain Asso-
ciation of Credit Men. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, before the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson, District Judge, sitting without a jury on 
September 23, 1966. Judge Jeppson ruled that there 
was a partnership relationship between defendants 
Rolfe Griffiths and his father-in-law, defendant, F. C. 
'Vatterson, and, granted Judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant, F. C. Watterson. It is from 
this Judgment defendant F. C. Watterson appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant F. C. Watterson seeks re-
versal of the Judgment against him and for Judgment 
in his favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the outset it should be pointed out that the 
designation in the Complaint of defendants Rolfe Grif-
fiths and F. C. Watters as former partners doing 
business as the Silver Creek General Store is a misnomer 
2 
and completely misleading. This was one of the issues 
for the District Court to determine. They never were 
partners. Defendant Watterson only aided and assisted 
his daughter and son-in-law in the operation of the 
Silver Creek General Store as any loving, considerate 
parent would normally do. 
Defendant Rolfe Griffiths is the husband of l\1ae 
Griffiths, who is the daughter of defendant F. C. 
W' atterson. In the spring of 1960 Rolfe Griffiths and 
his wife, Mae Griffiths, took over and started operating 
the Silver Creek General Store in Picabo, Idaho. (R. 
79). To enable them to get going in the business Rolfe 
and :Mae Griffiths borrowed some cash and some bonds 
from defendant F. C. 'Vatterson, their father and 
father-in-law. (R. 81). They, the Griffiths, operated 
the store for about a year. During the first six or seven 
months the 'Vattersons assisted them somewhat for 
which assistance Watterson was paid approximately 
$400.00 per month in merchandise. (R. llO). Arrange-
ments were made to have F. C. Watterson sign the 
store checks since Rolfe Griffiths was away from the 
store part of the time. (R. 91). However, in 1960, 
F. C. Watterson and his wife left the State of Idaho 
and returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 107, 144, 
172 & 193). Rolfe Griffiths and his wife, Mae Griffiths, 
continued to operate the store until about May of 1961. 
(R. 172). 
The Silver Creek General Store got into financial 
difficulties. As a consequence of these financial diffi-
3 
culties, in 1961, both Salt Lake Hardware Company 
and Barwick and Company sued defendants Rolfe 
Griffiths and F. C. Watterson in the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of 
Idaho in and for Blaine County designating them in 
those actions as co-partners doing business under the 
name and style of Silver Creek General Store. In those 
actions Salt Lake Hardware obtained Judgment against 
them on August 22, 1961, and, Barwick and Company 
obtained Judgment against them on September 1, 1961. 
The claims of these two companies were assigned to 
Intermountain Association of Credit Men, who, on 
May 9, 1962, filed an action against these defendants 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in a 
case entitled: Intermountain Association of Credit 
Men, Plaintiff, vs. Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. Watterson, 
f I dlbl a Silver Creek General Store, Defendants. Civil 
No. 136508. (Exhibit 11) . 
While the proceedings in Civil No. 136508 (Ex-
hibit 11 ) in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, were still pending, and, approximately a year 
and one-half after the filing of that case, the Inter· 
mountain Association of Credit l\Ien filed another law 
suit against these same defendants, this cause, Civil 
No. 145459, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, which cause is the subject matter of this Appeal. 
Since two cases involving the very same relief were 
pending at the same time against these defendants, 
Motions to dismiss Civil No. 136508 (Exhibit 11) were 
made by both plaintiff and defendants, and, on March 
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27, 1964, Judge Aldon J. Anderson made and entered 
an Order dismissing Civil No. 136508 as to defendant 
R. C. 'i\T atterson, with prejudice. (Exhibit 11). 
Subsequently, at the Pretrial of the case which 
is the subject matter of this Appeal, Civil No. 145459, 
Judge Stewart l\I. Hanson took under advisement de-
fendant F. C. \V atterson's l\Iotion to dismiss Civil No. 
145459, on the grounds of res judicata, since Civil No. 
136508 had previously been dismissed with prejudice 
on March 27, 1964. (R. 12 & 13). Then on December 
13, 1965, Judge Stewart M. Hanson made and entered 
his "Findings, Conclusions and Judgment" granting 
defendant F. C. \Vatterson Judgment in his favor 
against plaintiff, dismissing the said cause in Civil No. 
145459 with prejudice as to defendant F. C. 'Vatter-
son. (R. 14 & 15). On a .Motion for a New Trial and 
in a Memorandum Decision dated January 20, 1966, 
Judge Hanson set aside the Judgment of December 
13, 1965, and, the case which is the subject matter of 
this Appeal, Civil No. 145459, ·was set for Trial and 
thereafter tried before the Honorable Joseph G. J epp-
son, District Judge, without a jury on September 23, 
1966. 
During the trial of this cause which is the subject 
matter of this Appeal and after plaintiff had rested, 
<lef eudant F. C. 'Va tterson made a l\Iotion to dismiss 
the cause against him on the following grounds: (a) 
The Complaint failed to state a cause of action against 
him; (b) The matter was res judicata for the reason 
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the plaintiff previously filed an action in Civil No. 
136508 (Exhibit 11) against him involving the same 
parties and the same accounts which was heard by the 
Court and dismissed with prejudice; and, ( c) That 
there was not clear and convincing evidence to estab-
lish a partnership upon which the Court could grant 
a Judgment against defendant F. C. Watterson. (R. 
76). Judge Jeppson denied this Motion. 
Finally and at the conclusion of the Trial and after 
both parties had rested their cases and submitted and 
argued the matter, Judge Jeppson ruled that there was 
a partnership between defendants Rolfe Griffiths and 
his father-in-law, defendant F. C. \Vatterson, and, 
granted Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant F. C. Watterson. 
Defendant-appellant F. C. 'Vatterson makes his 
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah and in connec-
tion therewith seeks reversal of the Judgment against 
him and for Judgment in his favor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CASE SHOULD HA VE 
BEEN DISMISSED AGAINST DEFENDANT 
F. C. WATTERSON ON THE GROUNDS OF 
"RES JUDICATA". 
The only basis upon which Judgment legally could 
be rendered against defendant-appellant F. C. "Tatter-
son is that either there was an actual partnership or 
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a partnership by estoppel existing between F. C.,Vat-
terson and his son-in-law, defendant Rolfe Griffiths, 
in connection with the operation of the Silver Creel~ 
General Store in Picabo, Idaho. 
Assuming that there was such a relationship, the 
case against defendant F. C. \Vatterson, which is the 
subject matter of this Appeal, should have been dis-
missed with prejudice. 
Plaintiff's assignors, Salt Lake Hardware CoriI-
pany and Barwick and Company, had already sued 
said defendants Rolfe Griffiths and }'. C. 'Vatterson 
in the State of Idaho and obtained Judgments against 
them. Their claims, arising out of the operation of the 
Silver Creek General Store, were assigned to the Inter-
mountain Association of Credit Men, the plaintiff-
respondent herein. That company thereupon filed an 
action against both of said defendants in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Civil No. 136508 
(Exhibit 11). That action, involving the claims of Salt 
Lake Hardware Company and Barwick and Company, 
was dismissed as to defendant-appellant F. C. Y\T atter-
son, with prejudice, on :March 27, 1964. (Exhibit 11). 
The doctrine of "res judicata" is a universal doc-
trine recognized by all jurisdictions. It is based on 
the fundamental proposition that a party •who has 
litigated or who has had an opportunit;y to litigate a 
rnatter should not be permitted to litigate it again to 
the harrassment or vexation of his opponent. This 
doctrine is adhered to by the decisions in this jurisdic-
7 
tion which prohibit the "splitting" of a cause of action. 
It is expressly recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which provide in part in Rule 8 (a) as fol-
lows: 
" ... Relief in the alternative or of several 
different types may be demanded." 
The reasons and rationale which underlie this per-
vading rule of law are wel1 set forth in 30A Am. Jur., 
Judgments, Sec. 376, p. 373, as follows: 
" ... Public policy and the interest of litigants 
alike require that there be an end to litigation 
which, without the doctrine of res judicata would 
be endless. The doctrine of res judicata rests 
upon the ground that the party to be affected, 
or some other with whom he is in privity, has 
litigated, or had an opportuunity to litigate, the 
same matter in a former action in a court of 
competent jurisdiction, and should not be per-
mitted to litigate it again to the harrassment and 
vexation of his opponent. The doctrine of res 
judicata not only puts an end to strife, but pro-
duces certainty as to individual rights and gives 
dignity and respect to judicial proceedings." 
(Emphasis supplied) . 
The parties and cause of action set forth in Civil 
No. 136508 and Civil No. 145459 in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, against defendants Rolfe 
Griffiths and F. C. 'Vatterson were the same. In each 
instance the claims arose out of the operation of the 
Silver Creek General Store in Picabo, Idaho, by the 
said defendants as partners or as partners by estoppel 
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according to the allegations of plaintiff m the Com-
plaints which it filed. 
The doctrine of "res j udicata" prohibits one fron:;_ 
maintaining successive suits against the same defend-
ant on different theories of relief. As set forth in 
Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. Sec. 684, pp. 1443-H: 
" ... The application of the doctrine of res 
judicata to identical causes of action does not 
depend upon the identity or differences of the 
forms of the two actions. A Judgment upon 
the merit bars a subsequent suit upon the same 
cause, though brought in a different form of 
action, and a party therefore cannot, by varying 
the form of action or adopting a different method 
of presenting his care, escape the principle that 
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice 
litigated." 
In Civil No. 136580 plaintiff-respondent did have 
an opportunity to litigate the claims of Salt Lake Hard-
ware Company and Banvick and Company which had 
been assigned to it on any possible theory it wanted 
to present, including the theory it subsequently set 
forth in Civil No. 145459, the subject matter of this 
Appeal. Having chosen not to amend its complaint in 
Civil No. 136580, but, having chosen voluntarily to 
file an entirely new action almost a year and one half 
later in Civil No. H5459, it is bound by the doctrine 
of "res judicata" and the ruling made by the District 
Court on :March 27, 1961<, in Civil No. 136580, which 
ruling it chose not to appeal. 
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In applying the doctrine of "res judicata" it is 
sometimes proper to presume a judgment to have been 
rendered on the merits in the absence of words of quali-
fication. See in this connection 30A Am. J ur., J udg-
ments, Sec. 469, p. 511, wherein it is said: 
" . . . In some cases it is held proper to pre-
sume a judgment to have been rendered upon 
the merits where it is unaccompanied by words 
of qualification such as "without prejudice," or 
other terms indicating a right or privilege to 
take further legal proceedings on the subject." 
However, it is conclusive and needs no presumption 
at all where the judgment of dismissal is "with preju-
dice" as was the case in the Order in Civil No. 136508. 
(Exhibit 11) . This is particularly so when viewed in 
light of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which were 
in force and applicable at the time. When the Order 
of dismissal with prejudice was made and entered in 
Civil No. 136508 on March 27, 1964, Rule 41 (b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provided in the 
part particularly applicable to the situation before this 
Court as follows : 
" . . . a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismis.sal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue, operates as an adjudication up-
on the merits." (Emphasis supplied). 
Subsequently, both the District Court and the Supreme 
Court of Utah amended Rule 41 (b) to be effective 
10 
October 1, 1965, so as to make the applicable portion 
of that Rule read as follows: 
" . . . a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dism~ssal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable 
party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits." 
The case which plaintiff-respondent filed against 
defendant appellant F. C. \Vatterson in Civil No. 13C~-
508 was not dismissed with prejudice for "lack of juris-
diction'', for "improper venue" or, for "lack of an in-
dispensable party". Accordingly, in light of Rule 41 
(b) as it read previously and as it recently has been 
amended to read by the District Court and by the 
Supreme Court of Utah, the dismissal with prejudice 
of Civil No. 136508 was "an adjudication upon the 
merits". Further action by plaintiff in Civil No. 145459, 
the subject matter of this Appeal, was and is precluded 
by the doctrine of "res judicata". 
As set forth in 30A Am. J ur., Judgments, Sec. 
363: 
" ... The phase of the doctrine of res judicata 
precluding subsequent litigati~n . of the. sa~ne 
cause of action is much broader m its apphcat10n 
than a determination of the questions involved 
in the prior action; the conclusiveness of the 
fudgment in such case etdends not only to mat-
ters actually determined, but also to other 1~at~ 
ters which could properly have been determznea 
in the prior action. ( Olwell vs. Hopkins, 28 Cal. 
11 
2d 147, 168 P2d 972; Colburn vs. Goodall, 72 
Cal. ~98, 14 .P. 19~>): 11his rule applies to every 
question f allzng within the purview of the origi-
nal action, in respect to matters of both claim 
and def e~e which .c?uld have been P!esented by 
the exercise of diligence. There is authority 
that even where the causes of action are different 
the prior determination of litigated issues is con~ 
~lusiv:e in a subsequent suit not only as to the 
issue itself, but also as to every matter that might 
have been urged for or against that issue in its 
determination ... " (Emphasis supplied). 
The rulings by the Supreme Court of Utah are 
entirely consistent with the foregoing general law and 
judicial decisions. The District Court of Salt Lake 
County should have dismissed the action which is the 
subject matter of this Appeal against def endant-appel-
lant F. C. Watterson. See in this connection the follow-
ing: Dorsett vs. Morse, ______ Utah ______ , 103 Pac. 969; 
Glen Allen Mining Co. vs. Park Galena, 77 Utah 362, 
296 Pac. 321; East Mill Creek Water Co. vs. Salt Lake 
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P2d 863; and, Ray vs. Con-
solidated Freightways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P2d 196. 
POINT II. THERE IS NO CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
OF A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN ROLFE 
GRIFFITHS AND F. C. 'i\TATTERSON IN 
THE OPERATION OF THE SILVER CREEK 
GENERAL STORE UPON WHICH THE 
COURT COULD GRANT A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT F. C. 
WATTERSON. 
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The Court's attention is respectfully invited to 
the Findings of Fact upon which the Judgment against 
defendant-appellant F. C. Watterson is bas~d. The 
only finding made as to either an "actual" partnership 
or a partnership by estoppel is that set forth in Finding 
of Fact No. 1, reading as follows: 
"That there was a partnership between the 
Defendant F. C. Watterson and Rolfe Griffiths, 
doing business as Silver Creek General Store, 
at all times referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint". 
It is respectfully submitted that this is not a "finding 
of fact" but merely a "conclusion of law" not based 
on any recited facts. Apparently the reason no facts 
were recited is that there are no facts constituting clear 
and convincing evidence upon which the legal conclu-
sion of a partnership could be based. 
It is interesting to observe in this connection that 
apparently counsel for plaintiff-respondent also recog-
nized that there were no such facts. In his concluding 
argument to the District Court (not reported) he very 
strongly and almost exclusively urged that even if the 
facts did not show an actual partnership between Rolfe 
Griffiths and F. C. Watterson, Judgment nevertheless 
should be granted in favor of plaintiff and against 
F. C. Watterson on the basis of a partnership by estop-
pel. A partnership by estoppel could not be relied 
upon, however, because in the first place it was not 
pleaded. Furthermore, defendant F. C. Watterson 
specifically denied that there was a partnership. (R. 
10). 
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'Vith reference to the matter of a partnership by 
estoppel it is set forth in 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, Sec. 153 
( 1), Necessity for Pleading, at page 7 43, that: 
"Estoppel. 01:dina~ily must be specially plead-
ed, whether it is relied on as a defense or as an 
element of a cause of action." 
See also the rulings of this Court in the following cases: 
Campbell vs. Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P2d 899; Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co. vs. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 
509, 132 P2d 388; Lagoon Co. vs. Utah State Fair 
Ass'n., 117 Utah 213, 214 P2d 614; and, Collett vs. 
Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P2d 730. 
As to the evidence in the record concerning any 
actual partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. 
'V atterson, both Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. Watterson 
denied that there was such a partnership. (R. 81, 9~, 
96 and 104). Mae Griffiths and Mae Waterson, the 
"\Vives of the respective defendants, also denied that 
there was such a partnership. (R. 142, 143, 200, 201 
and 202). 
The strongest evidence in the record as to a pur-
ported actual partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and 
F. C. Watterson is the testimony of J. Heber Reese, 
the Treasurer of Salt Lake Hardware Company. His 
actual testimony and the other evidence in the record 
belies the claim that there ever was a partnership or 
that the question of a partnership relationship was ever 
relied upon in the extension of credit. 
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Mr. Reese testified that there was a meeting in the 
Salt Lake Hardware store in early 1960 when pur-
portedly Mr. Watterson, his son-in-law, Rolfe Griffiths, 
and his daughter, came in to talk to them and make 
arrangements for credit at the store. ( R. 33). He testi-
fied further that he extended credit to the Silver Creek 
General Store for and on behalf of Salt Lake Hard-
ware based almost entirely upon the financial infor-
mation furnished at that meeting and which he set down 
in his own handwriting in a document entitled "Credit 
Interview". (Exhibit I) . His testimony with reference 
to this as set forth in the Transcript at page 26 (R. 
55) is as follows: 
Q. Can you tell us whose decision whether or 
not credit is extended? 
A. Mine. 
Q. In this case you did decide to have the com-
pany extend credit, in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What facts did you rely on in making this 
decision? 
A. Almost entirely upon the financial informa-
tion (which) was furf!ished to us. 
Shortly after this testimony there was a five minute 
recess. During the recess Mr. Henriksen, one of the 
attorneys for plaintiff-respondent, discussed this testi-
mony with him, and, when the Court reconvened, Mr. 
Reese then testified as follows: (See Transcript 28, 29 
-R. 57, 58). 
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Q. Mr. Reese, I asked you upon what informa-
tion you relied, you indicated the financial 
information receiyed. and I asked you if you 
would list for us, or itemize for us· the inf or-
mation you referred to. 
l\1R. HENRII\:SEN (should be l\1R. AL-
STON): I object as repetitious. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
Q. (MR. l\1UHDOCK) : ·lv ould you answer 
the question? 
A. \Vhat was the question? 
Q. If you would list for us the information you 
are referring to w horn you said you relied 
upon it. 
THE COURT: \Vhat you relied on to extend 
credit. 
A. The credit extension was given based upon 
the financial statement that I had made out 
by hand, plus the confirmation from Dun 
& Bradstreet, this was a partnership, which 
we cleared on each new account we open, 
plus, I think we tried to clear with Inter-
mountain 's report, but they did not have one. 
It was based upon the financial staternents 
given us, and the confirmation frorn Dun q; 
Bradstreet that (it) 7J.:as a partnership. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
F. C. Watterson denied that he was ever at that 
meeting as did his wife, l\Iae \Vatterson, and, so did 
Rolfe Griffiths and his wife, l\Iae Griffiths. (R. 80, 
86, 100, 103, 121, 139, 172, 183 and 192). 
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The assets referred to in the financial statement 
which was testified to by Mr. Reese are solely those 
assets belonging to Rolfe Griffiths and Mae Griffiths, 
his wife, except an item of $1,600.00 in bonds and an 
item of $3,000.00 in cash, which said items it is uncon-
tradicted were loaned to Rolfe Griffiths and Mae 
Griffiths by their father-in-law and father, defendant-
appellant F. C. Watterson. 
In connection with the aforesaid testimony of Mr. 
Reese, the Court's attention is specifically invited to 
the following: On the "Financial Statement," which is 
on the reverse of Exihbit 1, appears the following: 
"For the purpose of obtaining merchandise 
from you on credit, I (we) make the fallowing 
statement in writing, intending that you should 
rely thereon respecting my (our) financial con-
dition as of (Date) ... 3-21-1960." (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Rolfe Griffiths signed that statement but it was 
not signed by F. C. Watterson. Now if Mr. Watterson 
was in fact present at the meeting in question, surely 
l\fr. Reese would have had him sign it. Furthermore, 
if there was any ambiguity at all about the statement 
it should be most strictly construed against Salt Lake 
Hardware and the plaintiff-respondent herein because 
it was the statement set forth on the form supplied 
by that company and filled out in the handwriting 
of its Treasurer, who had the responsibility of and 
the authority for extending credit. The said financial 
statement cannot be construed as the financial state-
17 
ment of llolfe Griffiths and F. C. 'V atterson under 
the circumstances because it was signed only by Rolfe 
Griffiths and recites unequivocally that "I (we) make 
the following statement in writing, intending that you 
should rely thereon respecting my (our) financial con-
dition .... " (Emphasis supplied). 
The Court's attention is also respectfully invite<l 
to the further testimony of l\lr. Reese that the extension 
of credit to the Silver Creek General Store was based 
"upon the financial statements given us, and the con-
firmation f ram Dun & Bradstreet that (it) was a part-
nership." (Emphasis supplied). (R. 57 and 58). \Vith 
reference to the Dun & Bradstreet Report (Exhibit 
3), it was admitted in evidence over the objection of 
defendant-appellant 'Vatterson made at the time as 
follows: (See Transcript 42 and R. 71) : 
l\1R. ALSTON: "\Ve, for the record, object, 
on the grounds it is hearsay. That is data they 
have not shown this defendant had knowledge 
of having been sent out, that the original docu-
ment was furnished with his signature on it, 
or had any anthorization for the use of this de-
fendant's signature. And we do not even know 
from this defendant (witness) whether in fact 
it was an actual signature or facsimile signature." 
Even though the Dun & Bradstreet Report was 
e;Toneously admitted in evidence as against defendant-
appellant F. C. 'Vatterson, the most significant part 
about this evidence is that it was not furnished Salt 
Lake Hardware Company for more than fifteen months 
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after the meeting of March 21, 1960, referred to in 
Exhibit 1, and the testimony of Mr. Reese relating 
thereto, more than a year after the Silver Creek General 
Store had folded up, and, more than eight months after 
the Wattersons had already left the State of Idaho and 
returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. The testimony of 
Verne C. Thacker, District Service Manager for Dun 
& Bradstreet, who was called as plaintiff's witness for 
the purpose of testifying about and identifying the 
said report, as set forth on page 43 of the Transcript 
( R. 72) , is as follows: 
Q. Mr. Thacker, I believe you said copy of that 
report would have gone to Salt Lake Hard-
ware June, 1961? 
A. Yes. 
Q. '-'T ould this be the first report they would 
have received? 
A. This is the only record I have requesting a 
credit report. 
Q. June 14, 1961? 
A. June 14-let me check that. June 14, 1961. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In writing about the account of Silver Creek Gen-
eral Store with Salt Lake IIardware the letters from 
Salt Lake Hardware were never addressed to F. C. 
Watterson, but only to Rolfe Griffiths. See Exhibits 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. · 
Also, even though the operation of the Silver 
Creek General Store was discussed on many occasions 
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with the only representative from Salt Lake Hardware 
who visited the store in Picabo, Idaho, a party by the 
name of Jim Nichols, he was not brought in by plain-
tiff to testify that in the operation of the store there 
was a partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. 
Watterson. The fact is and the evidence in the record 
demonstrates that there was no such partnership. 
In connection with the competent and legally ad-
missible evidence to establish the existence of a partner-
ship, Section 14-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
"In determining whether a partnership exists 
these rules shall apply: 
( 1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, per-
sons who are not partners as to each other 
are not partners as to third persons. 
( 2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy 
by entireties, joint property, common prop-
erty, or part ownership, does not of itself 
establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners do or <lo not share any profits made 
by the use of the property. 
( 3) The sharing of gross returns does not of 
itself establish a partnership, whether or 
not the persons sharing them have a joint 
or common right or interest in any property 
from which the returns are derived. 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business ~s prima f ~cie evidence 
that he is a partner m the busmess, but no 
such inference shall be drawn if such profits 
were received in payment: 
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(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
( b) As wages of an employee or rent to a 
landlord. 
( c) As an annuity to a widow or represen-
tative of a deceased partner. 
( d) As interest on a loan, though the 
amounts of payment vary with the 
profits of the business. 
( e) As the consideration for the sale of the 
good will of a business or other prop-
erty by installments or otherwise. 
The exceptions referred to in Section 48-1-13 deal with 
a partnership by estoppel and are not applicable in 
this case because such a partnership was neither pleaded 
nor proved as required. 
Mutual assent is necessary to a partnership. See 
68 C.J.S., Partnership, Section 8, page 412. An agree-
ment to share profits is an essential element of the part-
nership relationship. See 68 C.J.S., Partnership, Sec-
tion 17, page 427. As to the sharing of both profits and 
losses, it is set forth at page 431, in C.J.S., Partnership, 
Section 19, that: 
" . . . an indispensable essential of the rela-
tionship, although not necessarily by express 
provision, is a mutual undertaking of the par-
ties to share in both the profits of the business 
and the burden of making good the losses .... 
The absence of such a community of interest 
in profits and losses indicates that no partner-
ship ex is ts." 
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The burden of proving the existence of a partnership 
rests on the party having the affirmative of that issue. ' 
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed. 
The existence or non-existence of a partnership is not 
to be established by the opinions or the belief of parties 
to litigation or of their witnesses or by hearsay testi-
mony. 
In this case there was no mutual assent to a pur-
ported partnership between Rolfe Griffiths and F. C. 
Watterson. They did not share in the profits or losses. 
They denied that there was a partnership. There is no 
competent or clear and convincing evidence in the rec-
ord that there was such a partnership. To sustain the 
Judgment in this case would be to enunciate a rule that 
whenever a father-in-law aids and assists his daughter 
and son-in-law and loans them money and other prop-
erty, he thereby ipso facto becomes a partner with them. 
This is not the law and certainly should not be the law. 
To hold that such was the law would be a devastating 
and shattering blow to any family relationship. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons eluciated herein, and, based on the 
evidence in the record and the law applicable thereto, 
the Judgment against F. C. Watterson, the father-in-
law of Rolfe Griffiths, should be reversed and J udg-
ment entered in his favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Attorney for defendant-
a ppellant 
405 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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